INTRODUCTION
The new rules of world economy, which started with the lowering and dismantling of customs barri ers, have made continuous lookups necessary for the new markets. Globalization and internationalization have become keywords in daily business newspapers.
But the accessibility of markets is not easy. It is necessary to surpass geographic, economic and even political difficulties and barriers. However, the enter prises have at their disposal means and tools for surpassing those barriers, which allow them study, penetration and establishment of their position in the markets.
Europe has often been depicted in the popular and business press as homogeneous entity, especially since the late 1980s. Managers were exhorted to pay attention to EU, or to go to Europe without regard for where their business would be located. Cultural, political regulatory, differences exist between West ern European countries. Indeed, many writers have described these differences. However, much of the material about country differences in Western Europe has been neither normative nor based on single-subject case studies (Nitsch, et al, 1996) . While scholars have developed and tested several models of entry mode selection, deciding whether to choose a wholly owned venture, joint venture, or license agreement, no well-developed theory of diversification mode choice, using an acquisition or greenfield start-up exists (Barkema and Vermeulen 1998; Hennart and Park, 1993) . Previous studies of diversification mode have examined the influence of a variety of factors, but have offered no coherent theoretical framework for exploratory variables.
Following the recommendations of previous work, we took a step toward developing a more comprehen sive theory by investigating the influence of institu tional, cultural, and transaction cost advantages on international diversification mode choice by adding new variables such as the power of the yen and the manager's nationality.
We also made a distinction between the types of entry mode by adding an independent variable, equal to one, if entry is made through an acquisition, and zero if it is a greenfield entry. Another distinction is that we developed three degrees of ownership of the Japanese parent company in the foreign investment and four models. For each degree, the test results are discussed for each of the four models. Ultimately, the result was compared across the three degrees, and differences between them and their potential causes were discussed.
The inability of the firm to build internally all the needed knowledge and competencies forces it to acquire these from outside, influencing their growth strategy. As resources and complementary assets are spread out, the firm has to deal with constraints, which become more crucial when the firm enters into unfamiliar markets and areas of activity. In particu lar, when deciding about the entry mode on foreign markets, the firm has to face transaction costs con cerning factors and potential partners, their oppor tunism, and costs related to the need for acquiring information about new institutional environments and their workings.
According to this view, the resort to co-operative solutions and joint ventures allows firms to reduce costs and uncertainty related to foreign markets.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
A key difference between entry through foil own ership and entry through joint venture is that the complementary inputs needed for entry are pur chased in different markets. Hence the choice be tween these two entry modes hinges on the relative cost of buying complementary inputs. The relative cost of the investment depends on the value of the US Dollarn. In our case Hypothesis 1: The stronger the value of the Yen rela-1 ) With the appreciation of the yen, about 40% of the Japanese subsidiaries in Europe increased imports of parts and materials from Asia, and more than 90% of companies reduced imports from Japan. (JETRO, 1996) 
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tively to the US Dollar, the higher the attractiveness of entry through full ownership relative to joint venture.
Japanese investment in Europe grew significantly in the late 1980s, but was heavily concentrate in a few industries. (Nitsch, et al. 1996) . Entry mode preferences have also shifted, away from greenfield start-ups to a stronger use of joint ventures.
Hypothesis 2: The manufacturing industry of the Japa nese subsidiary affects the entry mode.
When the parent company is diversifying through a FDI, uncertainty and information costs may be higher, so less-control ownership modes may be preferred. Foreign investors are also more likely to enter a foreign market through joint ventures or strategic alliances if they are diversifying into a different industry, as they need tacit industryspecific knowledge, which is subject to relevant transaction costs and is also costly to acquire on the market (Hennart and Park, 1993) . Such a commitment not only strains a company's capital and human resources, but also increases business and political risks (Hennart, 1988) . The higher costs suggest that as the investment size increases, multinationals are more likely to choose a shared control mode such as a joint venture2).
Hypothesis 5: The higher the size of the subsidiary relative to that of the Japanese mother company, the greater the probability of an entry through joint venture.
As a firm expands its operation overseas, it has learned more about how to cope with different environments in terms of economic, political and legal systems, as well as the cultural distances. These learning skills can be applied to new foreign invest ment opportunities. When firms make international investments, specific knowledge of the host country is gained as is more general knowledge of conducting international operations (Barkema et al., 1998) . As argued by the internationalization theorists, firms with more experience in a host country have devel oped organizational capabilities suited to that coun try, and are able to make greater commitments to foreign investments (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) . Hypothesis 7: Full ownership will be preferred to joint venture when the subsidiary's manager is Japanese.
Although there can be a tendency to minimize the importance of the country choice, once the decision to locate in Europe has been made, the country choice is effective. The size of a foreign market influences entry mode decisions (Buckley and Casson, 1996) . The large market potential justifies the high risk and high control modes because of the benefits of economies of scale and long-term market presence.
Hypothesis 8: Full ownership will be preferred to joint venture when the Japanese company invests in a country with a high GDP.
METHODOLOGY

Scope of the study
This empirical study focuses on Japanese manufac turing firms, which established new entities in the manufacturing sector3) in the European Union. We are focusing on the choice of the MNE's between taking full ownership of their affiliate (establishing a wholly owned greenfield subsidiary, or making a full acquisition), and sharing it with another firm (set ting up a greenfield joint venture, or making a partial acquisition)
Sample
The data used for this study was obtained from Toyo Keizai Inc., Japanese overseas investment, , 1996) this study, only operations in the European Union countries were examined. The basic selection criteria were that a subsidiary had to be in the manufactur ing sector and established between 1992 and 2000.
After adjusting for missing data and excluding countries, the final sample size was 213 subsidiaries (wholly owned and shared subsidiaries).
The database consists of 213 manufacturing affili ates; Japanese entries between 1992 and 2000 of which 84 (39.4%) were partially owned and 129 (60.6%) were wholly owned.
Dependent Variable
The proxy considered for the dependent variable is the equity share held by the Japanese parent com pany at the moment of entry. In order to maintain homogeneity with almost all the other empirical studies in the literature, we built the dependent variable considering the threshold between full control and joint venture as 95% ownership of the capital of the foreign unit.
To investigate further the influence of the host countries on the choice of the entry mode, we also did the same work considering the threshold between full control and joint venture as 80% ownership of the capital of the foreign unit, and after that as 51% ownership of the capital of the foreign unit. Simi larly, the threshold between FDI and financial invest ment is assumed as 10%. Thus, the dependent vari able is equal to unity in the case of a joint venture subsidiary i.e., the equity owned by the Japanese investor is at least 10% and less than 95% of the foreign unit's at the moment of entry, and zero in the case of a wholly owned subsidiary i.e., if the Japanese investor owned more than 95% of the foreign unit's equity at the moment of entry. Shared equity affili ates include both joint ventured greenfield and partial acquisition, while wholly owned affiliates are both wholly owned greenfield and full acquisitions.
Because of the nature of the dependent variable, we use a binomial logistic model, in which the regression coefficients estimate the impact of the independent variables on the probability that the affiliate will be partially owned.
•34-TheChoice between Joint Ventures and Wholly Owned Subsidiaries : theCase ofJapanese Direct Investment in Europe.
Independent Variables
The regression coefficients estimate the impact of the explanatory variables on the probability that the foreign unit is a joint venture by the Japanese parent company. A positive coefficient means that the corresponding independent variable tends to in crease the probability that a joint venture arrange ment mode will be chosen, while a negative coeffi cient means that the independent variable tends to increase the probability of wholly owned entry.
Concerning the explanatory effects, we use the following set of independent variables. RELASIZE is used to provide more comparable scale units as other variables used in the model and it is a dimensional aspects variable.
A dummy variable which is equal to one if the subsidiary is in a resource-based industry, and zero otherwise is used as a resource-based industry vari able (INDUSTRY).
The international experience variables are the export ratio of the parent company (EXPRATIO) and a dummy variable which is equal to one if the parent company had an experience in the same country (SAMECOUN). The greater these variables are, the lower the need to enter into a market as a joint venture.
A socio-cultural distance variable is also used. It is a dummy variable indicating whether the subsidi ary's manager is Japanese or not (MANAGER).
Because nationality and cultural groups are good determinants of many common managerial problems related to human resource management.
The three largest economies in the European Union (United Kingdom, France and Germany) account for more than 63.38% per cent of the subsidi aries in the sample. Because of the large number of firms available for study in each of these countries, more detailed observations can be made about them.
France, Germany, United Kingdom are dummy variables used to capture the effect of these countries on the entry mode4). They are the country variables (Host country risk or restrictive ness) To see if entry is effected through an acquisition or through a greenfield subsidiary, an independent variable will be modeled by a dummy variable, which is equal to one if entry is made through an acquisi tion and zero if it is a greenfield entry (ENTRYMOD). It is our control variable. We expect this variable to be insignificant. If the coefficient of this independent variable is significant, this suggests that Japanese subsidiaries created through acquisi tions tend to be shared-equity ventures. Table 1 gives statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables used in the study. The matrix of the independent variables suggests little collinearity.
RESULTS
Almost all correlations are low, the two highest coefficients being the ones between SAMECOUN and LOGSALMO (.446) and between LOGSALMO and EXPRATIO (.399).
To investigate further the influence of the host countries on the choice of the entry mode, we devel-5) The other countries are: Austria, Belgium, Den mark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the Netherlands.
ped three degrees of ownership of the Japanese parent company in the foreign investment and four models. For each degree, the test results are discussed for each of the four models. Ultimately, the result will be compared across the three degrees, and differences among them and their potential causes will be dis cussed.
We considered the thresholds between full control and joint venture by using 95%, 80% and 51% ownership of the capital of the foreign unit. We call Overall, the data supported the model, although -36-
The Choice between Joint Ventures and Wholly Owned Subsidiaries : the Case of Japanese Direct Investment in Europe. LOGSALMO is significant at 0.10 level, but enter ing with a positive sign, suggesting that Japanese investors tend to prefer joint ventures to wholly ownership when the size of the parent company is large. This contradicts hypothesis 4 which conjec tured that when the size of the parent company is big, full ownership will be preferred to joint venture.
As predicted by Hypothesis 7, the coefficient of MANAGER, our measure of endowment in human resources, is negative and significant. Full ownership is therefore preferd when the top manager of the subsidiary is Japanese. markets, the size of the subsidiary and the stronger the value of the Yen relative to the US Dollar does not increase the probability that the Japanese entrant will opt for a joint venture, as we suggested in hy pothesis 1, 6, and 5.
Regarding the size, and the GDP of host country markets, and for the country dummy, only GER MANY was significant. It has the sign predicted by the hypothesis 8, suggesting that a high control mode is more likely when Japanese invest in Ger many.
In the models 2 and 3, the main effect variables
show similar results to those in the original model The variable ENTRYMOD is not significant. We expected this variable to be insignificant. If the coefficient of this independent variable was signifi cant, this suggests that Japanese subsidiaries created
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INDUSTRY: Entry into resource-based industry (Resource-based =1; otherwise=0).
COMMON: Sameness of products between parent and subsidiary. ENTRYMOD: Type of ownership.
through acquisitions tend to be shared-equity ven tures. But it is not the case in our sample.
Changes appear in the reduced sample (model 4).
The variable SAMECOUN is no longer significant and the variable MANAGER is weakly significant at 0.10 level. This can mean that when the Japanese decide to enter the three more advanced countries in Europe, their experience in these countries and the nationality of the manager has no effect on their choice of the entry mode. COMMON and GERMANY lose their previous strong significance and are no more significant at 51%. (COMMON is not significant at 80% too).
MANAGER remains significant in both 80% and 51%, and it gains a strong significance at 0.01 level in 51%.
The same thing for the independent variable LOGSALMO. It remains positively significant and gains a strong significance at 0.05 in both 80% and 51%, while it was at 0.1 level in 95%.
The significance of RELASIZE rises in both models at 80% and 51%. The positive significance of RELASIZE suggests that the Japanese prefer joint In particular, it is worth noticing the nonsignificance of SAMECOUN, our measure of the experience, in both 80% and 51%. Having experience in the same country does not increase the probability that the Japanese entrant will opt for a joint venture, as conjectured in hypothesis 6. It probably depends on the foreign investments undertaken by the Japa nese firms that have a very high control on the European subsidiary (more than 95%).
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we developed and tested a model of The variable related to the endowment in human resources confirms the hypothesis 7 that a manager's nationality influences the propensity of a firm to go abroad through wholly owned initiatives rather than joint ventures. The coefficient of MANAGER is negative as expected and is significant in all three degrees of ownership ("cut offs").
When nationality and cultural group assume a crucial role, when they are good determinants of many common managerial problems related to human resource management and when the competi tive success of the firm depends on the capability of the company to manage them, wholly own subsidiar ies represents the best solution.
5 ) The original model (model 1, cut off 95%) Our result is in contradiction with the previous studies perspectives ( Mutelli and Piscitello, 1998; Mansour and Hoshino, 2002 ) that the probability of undertaking a wholly owned subsidiary increases when the firm has a larger size.
The main findings of this paper can be summarized as follows.
The greater the Japanese firm's investment in Europe the more likely it will choose joint ventures over wholly owned subsidiaries.
Likewise, very large, and highly internationalized firms show a propensity toward joint ventures.
We also found that the probability of undertaking a wholly owned subsidiary increases when the parent company has the same product as the estab lished subsidiary and when the manager in Europe is Japanese.
Nevertheless, this study also has limitations. The empirical study was conducted using the samples of Japanese subsidiaries in the European Union only.
This restricted the study to the behavior of onenationality parents in one host market. Future stud ies may be able to conduct more extensive tests with the samples including multiple-nationality parents in one host country or one-nationality parents in sev eral host countries.
Another limitation stems from the manufacturing emphasis of this study. 
